

## Romans

2/5-81

WHY IS THE BOOK OF ROM. 1<sup>ST</sup>. IN THE ORDER OF PAUL'S EPITLES,  
SEEING AS IT WAS THE 1<sup>ST</sup> WRITTEN?

- DOCTRINE - SO THAT X-ISTS WOULD FIRST BE EXPOSED  
TO DOCTRINES, A FOUNDATION UPON WHICH TO BUILD.  
LEARNING HOW THEY CAN FUNCTION EFFICIENTLY IN X-TEN  
BEING ABLE TO SERVE HIM IN THE LOCAL CHURCH.

\* THE ORDER OF ROM IN THE NT IS DEFINITELY SIGNIFICANT.

① DOCTRINE OF SIN: WHAT WE'RE SAVED FROM, WHY WE WERE  
SAVED, WHY WE NEED TO SHARE THIS GOSPEL w/ OTHERS  
MAN IS LOST - SPIRITUALLY DEAD IN SIN, A SINNER  
WILL NOT REALIZE HIS NEED FOR A SAVIOR UNTIL HE REALIZES  
HE'S A SINNER - WE ARE HOPELESS w/o CHRIST.

[Rom 1:18-3:20] → WE STAND CONDEMNED BEFORE GOD &  
DESTINED FOR ETERNAL JUDGEMENT. "GOD AGAINST US"  
TODAY WE HAVE LOST SOMETHING OF THE EMPH. ON SIN, THEREBY  
PRESENTING AN UNBALANCED GOSPEL.

② DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION: [3:21-5:21] REVEALS THE CURE  
FOR MAN'S SIN PROBLEM. "GOD FOR US" ANSWER TO THE  
DILEMMA OF HUMAN DISPARITY. GOD'S FAITH. THIS REALI-  
TION BEGAN THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION → WE CANNOT  
WORK FOR OUR SALV. CANNOT ACHIEVE RIGHTEOUSNESS  
ON OUR OWN. TO LOTHEK (AT FIRST) GOD WAS CRUEL, UNKIND.  
UNTIL HE READ ROMANS THE U.S. REVEALED  
TO HIM THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION.

GOD WORKS AS THE RESULT OF JUSTIFICATION, NOT  
THE MEANS TO JUSTIFICATION ← LOTHEK WAS FLAWED  
IN THIS AREA.

THE CURE OF JUSTIFICATION IS ABUNDANT LIFE  
"THE JUST SHALL LIVE BY FAITH" THIS IS EXPANDED  
IN THESE 3 BOOKS ↗ ROMANS - THE JUST  
GALATIANS - SHALL LIVE  
HEBREWS - BY FAITH 10:38

How can we live victoriously as a justified person?  
We still do have a sin nature, although we have been justified. Col 6:6 & 7 "God in us" [6:1-7:25]

(3) DOCTRINE of EXCUSE/DEFENSE: our position in X; our union w/ X → This is the provision for living the victorious life

(4) GOD "THRU US"

Rom. 8:1<sup>st</sup> is a continuation of "God in us" even.  
Upon the Holy Spirit controlling our lives  
2 sides } Human: responsibility of appropriating the provision  
{ Divine: provision for salvation  
By faith → how do we do this - By obedience  
to X.

Then... emphasis shifts to: preservation of the saints

Romans 9-11 PROPHETIC PAST  
ISRAEL → "God has not cast them away"  
PRESENT THEY ARE SET ASIDE  
FUTURE "THEIR DELIVERER SHALL GO FORTH."  
THEIR FUTURE'S SECURE BECAUSE THEY ARE  
A NATION ELECTED BY GOD.

## ROMANS

### PAUL'S THEMES AT A GLANCE

#### CHAPTER 1

##### A. INTRO - GREETINGS

1. PAUL'S APOSTLESHIP & GOD'S FORORDINATION (1:1-7)

B. PAUL'S SHARING W/ THIS ROMAN COMMUNITY (1:8-17)

i. CENTRALITY OF THE GOSPEL

C. THE NEED FOR THE GOSPEL: SIN

1. MANKIND'S REJECTION OF GOD (UNIVERSAL) (1:18-23)

2. THE RESULTS OF THAT REJECTION (SIN/DEPRAVATION) (1:24-32)

#### CHAPTER 2

D. THE UNIVERSALITY OF SIN (2:1-16)

1. GOD'S IMPARTIAL JUDGEMENT (FOR GOOD OR BAD)

2. BASIS RE: LAW → IS DOERS OF THE LAW

E. THE JEW'S DILEMMA (2:17-29)

1. CIRCUMCISION IS GOOD IF OBEDIENT TO THE LAW

2. TRUE CIRC. OF THE HEART = TRUE JEW

#### CHAPTER 3

F. THE JEW'S DILEMMA: CONTINUED

3. BENEFIT: RECEIVED GOD'S WORD (3:1-8)

[God's word is TRUE EVEN THOUGH Jew's FAILED]

4. NOB ARE RIGHTEOUS (JEW OR GENTILES) (3:9-20)

a. LAW TO SHOT THOSE UNDER IT

b. NO ONE JUSTIFIED BY THE LAW.

## F. JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH (3:20 - 4:25)

1. WITNESSED BY THIS O.T. (LAW & PROPHETS)
2. CHRIST PAID THE PRICE
3. NO BOASTING - GOD'S GIFT TO ALL

### CHAPTER 4

## E. JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH : CONTINUED (4:1-25)

4. ABRAHAM'S EXAMPLE

### CHAPTER 5

## G. RESULTS OF JUSTIFICATION

1. PEACE w/ GOD (5:1-2)
2. TRIBULATION → HOPE (5:3-11)
  - a. ∵ AS SINNERS GOD SENT CHRIST (TO DIE FOR US) -  
now as sons He'll give so much more (5:12-17)
3. ILLUSTRATION: ADAM → SIN: DEATH  
JESUS → OBEDIENCE (CROSS) = LIFE (5:18-21)

[REPLY TO FIRST OBJECTION TO JUSTIFICATION:

IT PROMOTES SIN 6:1-8:39]

### CHAPTER 6

## H. BEING ALIVE TO GOD (DEAD TO SIN)

1. GRACE TO LIFE NOT TO SIN (6:1-2)
2. BAPTISM ILLUSTRATION (6:3-10)
3. DEATH of SIN ON THE CROSS (6:13-13) [LAW]
4. SLAVES ILLUSTRATION : BE SLAVES TO GOD NOT SIN (6:14-23)

## CHAPTER 7

H. BELOVED'S ALIVE TO GOD: CONTINUED

5. MARRIAGE ILLUSTRATION (7:1-6)

[SIN DIED ON THE CROSS. NEW LIFE FREE FROM THE LAW (SIN'S IDENTIFIER) TO THE LAW OF THE SPIRIT.]

6. SIN & THE LAW (7:7-25)

## CHAPTER 8

I. NEW LIFE IN THE SPIRIT

1. THE LAW & THE SPIRIT (8:1-30)

2. CONQUERORS BY CHRIST (8:31-39)

[REPLY TO SECOND OBJECTION TO JUSTIFICATION:

IT ANNULLS GOD'S PROMISES 9:1-11:36]

## CHAPTER 9

J. GOD'S CHOICE (REFLECTIONS ON ISRAEL)

1. OT EXAMPLES (9:1-18, 24-33)

2. ILLUSTRATION: POTTER & THE CLAY (9:19-24)

## CHAPTER 10.

K. MISSING INGREDIENT: FAITH (REFLECTIONS ON ISRAEL) (10:1-21)

## CHAPTER 11

L. GOD'S CHOICE PT II (REFLECTIONS ON ISRAEL)

1. REJECTION IS NOT FINAL (11:1-10)

2. PART OF GOD'S PLAN (11:11-32)

3. OLIVE TREE ILLUSTRATION (11:16-24)

## L. GOD'S CHOICE PT II (REFLECTIONS ON ISRAEL): CONTINUED.

### 3 OLIVE BRANCH ILLUSTRATION

a. EXAMPLE TO US (DON'T BOAST / GET FROUD) (1P:25-32)

4. CONCLUSION: GOD'S WISDOM (11:33-36)

## CHAPTER 12

### M. SACRIFICE & SERVICE (12:1-21)

1. BODY OF CHRIST: ILLUSTRATION

2. GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT TO SERVICE

3. LOVE IN THE FELLOWSHIP

## CHAPTER 13

### N. REGARDING GOD'S SERVANTS (13:1-14)

1. GOD'S SERVANTS

2. DO GOOD (IN LIGHT OF CHRIST'S COMING)

## CHAPTER 14

### O. LOVE & THE WEAKER BROTHER (14:1-23)

1. TOLERATING CHRIST'S SERVANTS (FROM WHOM CHRIST DIED)

2. KINGDOM IS WORTH MORE THAN FOOD OR CUSTOMS.

## CHAPTER 15

### O. LOVE & THE WEAKER BROTHER: CONTINUED (15:1-33)

## CHAPTER 16

P. HELLOS & GOODBYES

1. CHRISTIAN WORKERS

2. WARNING TO WATCH OUT FOR FALSE PROPHETS

3. DOXOLOGY.

## THEMES IN ROMANS

### ~~ISBE THAT PAPER~~

THE NATURE OF GOD ( HIS SOVREIGNTY, FALCONERLEDGE, + ~~PERFECT~~  
RIGHTEDNESS + BENEFICENCE ) ~~THE PROBLEM~~ IS EXEMPLIFIED.  
HOWEVER

THE MAIN COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION IS JUSTIFICATION  
BY FAITH IN CHRIST. JUSTIFICATION IS SET UP <sup>FIRST</sup> AGAINST  
THE PROBLEM OF SIN + GOD'S RIGHTEDNESS + <sup>THEN</sup> ALSO WITH  
REGARDS TO THE PROMISES + COVENANTS OF GOD. AS ONE WOULD  
EXPECT THE NATIONAL HISTORY OF ISRAEL IS SCRUBBED UP AS  
THE EXAMPLE OF THIS DOCTRINE.

ON THE EXORTIVE SIDE OF THIS LETTER, PAUL GOES TO GREAT  
LENGTHS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ~~NOT~~ THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION  
SHOULD LEAD US AWAY FROM BOASTFULNESS + TOWARDS A MORE  
BALANCE + VIEW OF OUR POSITION ( ESPECIALLY REGARDING THE  
GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT, THE WEAKER BROTHER, + THE GOVT ). THE BOTTOM  
LINE IS THAT WE'RE SERVANTS ( THROUGH GOD'S GRACE + THE WORKING  
HIS JUSTIFICATION IN US BY FAITH IN CHRIST ).

### SOME NOTE

IF A BIBLICALLY BASED FAITH SHOULD LOSE ITS EXPRESSION  
IN REALITY IS IT TO BE TRUSTED ? ( THE REVERSAL OF THIS  
FOR'S WORKS w/o FAITH -- FOR NOW WE HAVE FAITH w/o  
WORKS ) etc.

state of the justified a complex of new relationships with God and the Trinity, but it insists, more than Protestant theology does, that these relations are real, based in the reality of things, and not merely psychological phenomena. It is because these relationships are real that created grace is required or is given as their objective foundation. If Protestants agree that the relationships with God originating in justification are real and objective, and not merely psychological or subjective appearance, and then, if they are not reluctant to go beyond Biblical terms, it is sufficient for them to make explicit what this reality implies to have an equivalent to created grace.

Thus it may appear that it is not impossible to present the Catholic doctrine on justification freed from its Tridentine anti-Protestant bias, and less far removed from the doctrine of the Reformation. In many respects, the differences between the two positions may be more in approach than in teaching.

*See also ADOPTION; SUPERNATURAL; CONVERSION TO LIFE OF GRACE; DESIRE TO SEE GOD, NATURAL; DESTINY, SUPERNATURAL; ELEVATION OF MAN; GRACE AND NATURE; GRACE, CONTROVERSIES ON; LIFE (THEOLOGICAL ASPECT); MAN, 4; METANOIA; NATURAL ORDER; PURE NATURE, STATE OF; REVIVISCENCE OF MERIT; VOCATION TO SUPERNATURAL LIFE.*

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[P. DE LETTER]

### 3. IN PROTESTANT THEOLOGY

The Protestant doctrine on justification is part of the Reformers' protest against the Catholic interpretation in doctrine and life of the Christian message of "salvation." Specifically, it was directed against an apparent overemphasis on good works and an undue reification of religious and moral values that turned religion into mechanical formalism to the neglect of man's personal attitude before God. The protest might have served a much-needed renewal of the theology of justification and "reform in the Church both for head and members had it not been led astray by, *inter alia*, a decadent nominalist theology. To grasp both the positive values and the deficiencies in the Protestant view of justification, then, one must (1) situate the doctrine in the whole of the Protestant doctrine of the Christian "kerygma"; (2) briefly recall its vicissitudes during the 4 centuries of its history; (3) analyze the common Protestant concept of justification by faith and grace alone; (4) indicate its valid basic intuitions and also the nominalist root of its deviations; and (5) point out a possible

ecumenical approach to the Catholic and Protestant theologies of justification.

**Justification in the Christian Message.** The gospel message of salvation says that men are saved in Jesus Christ, redeemed by His Passion, death, and Resurrection, and that justification is the application of that Redemption to individual persons [see PASSION OF CHRIST, II (THEOLOGY OF); RESURRECTION OF CHRIST; REDEMPTION, ARTICLES ON]. Such is the common Christian faith. This good news implies man's need of salvation and presupposes faith in the "fall of man. This, too, is the common Christian faith. The manner of understanding one's faith in the Fall largely determines one's understanding of Redemption and justification. Here, according to the common Catholic view, begins the parting of the ways. The Protestant view of justification logically presupposes the idea of a moral deterioration of man that is due to the Fall and incurable in this world. Accordingly, Christ's redemptive work, for all its being perfect and complete as "reconciliation with God the Father, does not undo the Fall and its consequences in individual men. Nor does its application to individual persons in their justification involve that they cease to be fallen men, sinners: they remain what they are, but in the eyes of God they are just because of Christ's "atonement for man's sins. This view entails the one that justification is in no way man's own achievement but only God's or Christ's; man is incapable of doing anything to turn himself from sinner into a just man; all he can do is throw himself in trusting faith on Christ, his Savior. "Good works will then follow as a fruit of justification and not as its cause or as having any sort of "merit. Nor can the mere reception of Sacraments effect anything by way of justification; external rites can at most be helpful in arousing faith and trust in Christ, the faith that alone justifies. Consequently, no "mediation of the Church's priesthood is needed to bring about a justification that is the direct and inseparable concomitant of man's faith in Christ. Since this faith springs from the gospel message of salvation, which, by the inspiration of the "Holy Spirit, man understands to be his personal concern, there is no need either of the Church's "teaching authority: by Scripture alone can fallen man find the way to justification and salvation.

Thus the inner logic of the Protestant theology of justification points to its doctrinal root in the theology of the Fall and to its central place in the Protestant understanding of the gospel message of salvation—at any rate in the original Protestant doctrine.

**Historical Vicissitudes.** In the 400 years of its life the original concept of justification has waxed and waned in importance as a factor in Protestant theology.

**Origins.** The historical origin of the Protestant view of justification lies in Martin Luther's personal experience of sinfulness and of the ineffectiveness of the ascetical practices in monastic life, and, further, in his discovery of the liberating doctrine of St. Paul that faith in Christ, not men's works, justifies from "sin. Luther was the religious genius of the "Reformation. The main points of doctrine in Protestant theology of justification were given in his experience. Faith in Christ alone justifies. Man's efforts and works are of no avail: Christ's grace alone justifies. He covers the sinner with His own justice, imputed to him for his justification (see IMPUTATION OF JUSTICE AND MERRIT). Even when justified, man remains a sinner. Faith in Christ invites man to follow

Christ in works of holiness, fruits of Christ's grace. When turning back to the Catholic doctrine on justification, in the impoverished garb of Ockham's \*nominalism, which was all he had known, Luther repudiated what was belied by his experience. Good works, merit, Sacraments are not the way to justification: only faith on man's part and grace on the part of Christ; man's free cooperation in his justification is illusion. Nor is man objectively changed in justification: he remains the sinner he was, being now both just and sinner. Luther came to these doctrines by intuition rather than by logic. \*Melanchthon was to give a systematized form to the Reformer's doctrine. One finds its formulation in the official creeds, e.g., in the \*Augsburg Confession, 4: "Men cannot be justified before God by their own strength, merits, or works, but are freely justified for Christ's sake through faith." And in the Formula of \*Concord, *Solida Declaratio*, 3.16 (BSLK 921): "Nevertheless they [the faithful] through faith on account of the obedience of Christ . . . are pronounced good and just and reputed as such, even though by reason of their corrupt nature they are sinners to this point and so remain as long as they bear this mortal body."

\*Calvin, the theological genius of the Reformation, while taking over the doctrine grown from Luther's experience, added his own more theological than religious findings. He completed the idea of grace with that of predestination [*see PREDESTINATION (IN NON-CATHOLIC THEOLOGY)*], and unlike Luther, insisted on man's ability and need of good works in proof of his justification. He did so with the desire of giving systematic expression to the pure doctrine of Scripture on justification. Similar attempts were made, independently of Calvin, by other great Reformers: \*Zwingli, \*Bucer, H. \*Bullinger.

The Protestant theology of justification at its start was closely connected with the experience of justification; it was the capital doctrine of the Reformers.

*Protestant Scholasticism.* In the schools of early Protestant orthodoxy (17th century) this situation changed. The theological reflection, begun already in the systematization of the great Reformers, lost the contact between religious experience and doctrine, and so the theology of justification gradually turned into a theory of conversions. Justification by faith was no longer the theme of Protestant theology but one of many. Its various elements, repentance and faith, sense of unworthiness and certitude of divine sonship, instead of coalescing, followed one another. Justification lost its central place. The nine-volume *Loci theologici* of Johann \*Gerhard (1582–1637) represents the acme of this scholastic orthodoxy's classical method, namely, by offering proof from Scripture and, as a means for systematic understanding of the doctrine, from Aristotelian philosophy.

*Pietism and Revivalism.* In reaction to the somewhat dry intellectualism of orthodox scholasticism, there followed with the rise of \*Pietism a sort of renewal of the theology of justification. Its forerunner was the spiritual Anabaptism (*see ANABAPTISTS*) of the early years of Protestantism, for which faith meant an interior illumination. Under the influence of Philipp \*Spener (1635–1705), one of the leaders of Pietist theology, a shift took place in the theology of justification: the emphasis was less on justification itself, with its dialectic of just and sinner, than on faith as experience. Faith became the overwhelming experience of conversion. With Count Nikolaus von \*Zinzendorf (1700–60) religion became

the mystical experience in which fear is absorbed in the assurance of salvation; conversion is a complete transformation and a source of fervor. Theology of justification became the description of conversion and rebirth as experiences of a reform of life.

Similar movements of \*revivalism, which followed later in various sections of Protestantism, turned it into a religion of the Spirit rather than a religion of the Bible, with emphasis on faith as spiritual experience, the doctrine on justification itself becoming secondary.

*Liberal Protestantism.* In liberal Protestantism, born in the age of the \*Enlightenment (18th century), Protestant theology of justification reached the low water mark and soon lost all significance. Friedrich \*Schleiermacher (1768–1834) became the father of liberalism and of the subsequent secularization of religion by reducing religion to the intuitive apprehension of man's total dependence on God, irrespective of any Christian doctrines (*see LIBERALISM, THEOLOGICAL*). Thus justification was emptied of every theological meaning. Faith itself, the religious consciousness of the Christian, was hardly connected with the historical Christian event. This paved the way, indicated by Schleiermacher himself, to a religion without God. In fact, after him, liberal Protestantism became a sort of religious \*rationalism, the Christian message being no longer the proclamation of \*grace and justification, but that of a moral humanism, the gospel of the progress of humanity (*see HUMANISM, SECULAR*). There was no place here for any theology of justification.

*Neoorthodoxy.* The inevitable reaction against the liberal tradition, with the neoorthodoxy of the 19th and 20th centuries, also entailed a revival or rehabilitation of the theology of justification. A. \*Ritschl (1822–89), in his historical and systematic theology, was the first to attempt restating Luther's doctrine on justification by faith alone, without, however, giving it the central place it had with the founder. His school after him was too occupied with other tasks, particularly the theology and defense of religion, to pay great attention to the doctrine of justification. Another and more influential effort was that of the \*dialectical theology. One of the first leaders of this "theology of crisis," Søren \*Kierkegaard (1813–55), in whom Protestantism returned to the cult of the Word, restated the paradoxical character of the faith that justifies. But it was above all the leader of the dialectical school, Karl Barth (1886– ), who gave Protestantism a reborn theology of justification. This is faithful to the theology of the Reformers and constitutes an important chapter, though not the most important, in his systematic theology. Barth himself said that the doctrine of justification did not recover in modern Protestantism the place it had with Luther. Not does it need to: to his mind it is faith in Jesus Christ rather than the doctrine on justification that is the *articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae*. Most remarkable in this Barthian theology of justification, as studied, e.g., by H. Bouillard or H. Küng, is its close agreement with the Catholic position, an agreement not repudiated by Barth. The two main points in this accord: his explanation of justification by faith and not by good works, which comes near the Catholic doctrine on the ineffectiveness of all human effort unaided by grace; and the description of the justified man as *simul justus et peccator*, a description which includes so realistic an approach to justice that it has a Catholic ring. Emil Brunner

Tillich are other dialectical theologians who follow Barth, each in his own way (see BARTHIANISM).

**Modern Protestantism.** Not all of modern Protestant theology has turned Barthian in its doctrine on justification. The liberal strand is still alive in such men as Rudolf Bultmann (1884- ), the demythologizer of the New Testament. For him the essentials of the faith in justification turn out to be an existentialist-secular call to man to transcend his "existential anxiety" (his "fallen state") by trustful surrender to the will of God. His impact on contemporary Protestantism is a proof that liberalism is not moribund, though it has undergone the influence of dialectical theology (see EXISTENTIAL THEOLOGY).

No need to dwell here on the Anglican doctrine of justification, which, in its Catholic trend (see Newman), is closer to the Catholic than to the Protestant position, and in its evangelical or liberal trends joins one or other of the above mentioned Protestant positions.

The above bird's-eye view of the history of Protestant theology of justification may suffice to suggest that there seems to be little development or progress in the doctrine; its history was rather a struggle, with reverses and successes, to salvage the teaching of the original Reformers.

**Justification by Faith and Grace Alone.** The attempt to reconstruct this teaching from the errors proposed to and condemned by the Council of \*Trent (Denz 1551-83) would yield, perhaps, a caricature. To mention just a few features of that treatment: Man does not freely cooperate in his justification, nor can he, since he is not really free. Whatever he does is sinful. He is justified by faith in Christ alone, by the sole imputation of Christ's justice, nothing really being changed in a man—after as before, a sinner. Justifying faith is trust in the forgiveness or nonimputation unto punishment of one's sins for Christ's sake, trust in one's being among the predestined. The certainty of that trust is what justifies, with a justice that can never be lost and that dispenses one from keeping the Commandments, a thing which, moreover, even for the justified, is impossible. No trust should man place in the merits of his own good works but only in the merits of Christ.

Few, if any Protestants, past or present, would recognize their faith in such a picture. In fact the oppositions between the doctrines of the Catholic and Protestant theologian were stiffened to the extent of deforming them in each other's eyes. There were real differences in doctrine, but perhaps they did not always lie where Trent seemed to place them—the result of mutual misunderstanding, unintentional, no doubt, but real.

Two main points need to be explained: on the one hand, the part of God and the part of man in justification; on the other, the state of man after justification, namely, the dialectic of one's being both just and sinner. For each of these, the Catholic counterpart will be stated.

**Part of Man, Part of God.** In his justification man's part is faith, not good works or any merit but trustful surrender to Christ and God; faith is not itself a good work or any merit but the mere passive expectation of God's forgiving mercy. God's part is grace, His gracious mercy or favor, which, because of Christ's atonement for man's sins, covers man's sinfulness with the mantle of the "justice of God or Christ's merit, and welcomes

the sinner as a just man and child of God. Man does nothing, he just receives God's gift; God does everything, taking the sinner unto Himself and so "making" him just.

Over against this stands the paradoxical Catholic concept: man freely cooperates with divine grace in \*repentance, \*faith, \*hope, and \*charity; yet it is God's grace that works the whole of a sinner's justification, including his free cooperation with grace.

Where does the real difference lie? The Catholic view stresses man's free cooperation with grace; the Protestant view stresses his passivity in total surrender. Faith in the Protestant sense includes, no doubt, hope and charity, but not, apparently, dogmatic faith: the intellectual element in justifying faith is negligible. Here is a difference between the two views: belief in truth enters or does not enter the process of justification. Further, in the Catholic view, the whole of man's cooperation with grace is itself a gift of God's grace; without the help of grace it is neither effective nor possible. This greatly narrows the distance from the Protestant view of a man's pure passivity. At any rate, both Catholics and Protestants stress that the whole of justification is the work of God's grace. Catholics say that man's cooperation is no human merit since it is God's gift. Accordingly, both positions consider God's part in a sinner's justification as doing everything; but while the Protestant view takes this to mean exclusion of man's free cooperation, the Catholic position holds that it includes this free cooperation.

**State after Justification.** A more radical difference concerns the state of justified sinners. The Protestant idea of forensic justification is that God, covering the sinner with His own justice, because of Christ's merit and atonement for sin, considers him as just without changing him objectively; the change lies only in the sinner's personal attitude to God on the psychological level: in his newly gained trust in the \*mercy of God. Hence, while remaining a sinner, he feels himself to be justified because he trusts that God in His mercy, because of Christ, designs to consider him as just. Thus he is both just and sinner, a dialectic that unites a deep religious sense of one's unworthiness before God with God's loving kindness toward the sinner. This synthesis of opposites is possible on the psychological level; it is not possible on the level of ontological reality. Only a nominalist theology allows one to conceive God considering a sinner as just without making him just, or covering up his sin and not imputing it to punishment without destroying it. In a realist theology it is inconceivable that God could justify a sinner without changing him in reality or forgive sin without deleting it. The Catholic theology of justification takes God's gracious and forgiving love seriously: grace transforms the sinner, God's merciful love re-creates the sinner into a just man, son of God.

Here the difference between the two formal concepts of justification is real; it springs from their respective nominalist and realist approaches to the religious fact of justification. But this very difference in approach lessens the discrepancy in the reality they both endeavor to convey. The two views move on different levels. The Protestant view is primarily a statement of psychological facts, a theology of religious experience in which man's awareness of his sinfulness remains, despite his trust in

God's forgiveness; it is his personal attitude to God, not his ontological reality, that is changed. The Catholic view considers the change of the sinner into a just man as real and objective, whatever may be the attending experience. Justification is in the first place an ontological, not a merely psychological, happening. The approach is different.

*Opposition More Apparent Than Real.* Because the two views move on different levels, their statements are more opposed in appearance than in reality. In the Protestant view, based on psychological experience, sin or sinfulness is identified with what Trent and Catholic theology call \*concupiscence: the inclination to evil that is innate in fallen man. This is not taken away in justification, both Catholics and Protestants agree; but, Protestants explain, it is no longer imputed unto punishment for those who trust in Christ; it is forgiven. In the Catholic view concupiscence is not sin in the proper sense of the term and need not be taken away in justification; this sense of sinfulness is sin only in an improper sense because it comes from sin and may lead to sin. The state of sin or of wilful separation from God is undone in justification by the infusion of charity and grace, i.e., by man's reorientation to God, an ontological happening of which he perceives only a partial reflection in his experience. Thus the real change, implied in the Catholic idea of justification, does not contradict the Protestant view that sin is not taken away (concupiscence in fact remains).

A corollary to the difference in views on man's cooperation with grace concerns good works and merit. Both theologies agree in saying that good works must be the fruit of justification. But Protestant theology denies their meritorious value, while Catholic doctrine affirms it. The difference springs from their views on man's free will. Protestants conceive man's fallen state as involving his incapacity for doing any \*salutary act by himself. The Catholic view agrees with this but adds that with the help of divine grace man is able to do good, the meritorious value of his good works being rooted in grace and so a gift of God's grace.

At the root of this difference lies what is perhaps the deepest division between the two mentalities: the very concept of \*man and \*God, creature and Creator. The gulf separating God and man cannot be bridged except by God Himself; but Catholics say that after the divine initiative has worked the miracle man is able with the help of God's grace to cross the bridge—while Protestants say that even then human reason and will are powerless and need to be taken across the bridge by God's grace.

**Valid Intuitions and Nominalist Deflections.** The important oppositions between the Protestant and Catholic doctrines should not hide some of Protestantism's basic valid intuitions. First among these is the personal approach to Christ and God, which determines a whole religious attitude. In Protestant theology faith means essentially a personal surrender to Christ. This may originally have been a reaction against the formalism of good works or against the soulless sacramentalism of the time. It has imprinted on the religious genius of Protestantism a personalism and individualism (exaggerated at times, perhaps) apparent in both prayer and doctrine. This basically healthy trend is exposed, however, to a deviation springing from the nominalist the-

ology that is (or was) its setting. It overstresses the psychological element and neglects the ontological reality of man's relationships to Christ and God.

Another insight of the Protestant theology is that of man's inability to reach out to God by his own unaided efforts and merits. This, no doubt, is the actual meaning of the often misunderstood *sola fide*, by faith alone. The trusting self-surrender to Christ is the way to justification, not in the sense of any active preparation or self-disposing for God's forgiveness, but of a purely passive receptivity. Sinful man's effort is no help here. This is right as an answer to every Semi-Pelagian attempt at claiming the initiative in justification. But when it leads to deny all, even the God-given, free cooperation with grace, then its nominalist shyness of ontological reality unduly refuses to recognize the re-creating force of divine grace. See REBIRTH (IN THEOLOGY).

The positive side of this sense of man's inability to reach out to God is a keen awareness of the inaccessible \*holiness of God and His absolute \*transcendence. The Protestant doctrine of justification by God's grace alone, by God's pure favor, rightly emphasizes that God alone can draw man to fellowship with Christ, He alone can raise sinful man to the relationship with God in Christ that trusting faith dares to expect because of Christ's atonement and merits. It is from above that the entire initiative comes all the time; from below there is nothing more than amazed trust in God's loving kindness. This intuition is right. God is so exalted above sinful man and above all creation that, unless in divine condescension He makes the gift of Himself, no man can aspire after an undreamed-of union with Him. Here once more Protestant theology stops halfway because of nominalist superficiality: the reluctance to believe in the ontologically transforming power of God's self-gift. Grace cannot mean only the divine favor leaving man intrinsically unaffected: it entails a newness in the forgiven sinner, by which he is reborn son of God, not only in name but in reality.

Moreover, in the paradoxical dialectic of the justified man being both just and sinner there lies hidden a deeply religious insight. There always remains even in the holiest of forgiven sinners a profound sense of sin, an abiding awareness of his unworthiness. The sense of God and the sense of sin grow *parl passu*: the greater the sanctity, the greater the sense of sin. Saints more than others recognize that of themselves they have but nothingness and sin, that all they are and have is God's undeserved gift. To less saintly persons, a similar insight shows them that their justice never does away with the inborn bent to evil and that their justice always remains God's gift to forgiven sinners (see JUSTICE OF MEN). Yet Protestant theology stops at the psychological dialectic of just and sinner; it fails to penetrate to the deeper paradox of the ontological transformation that grace produces in sinful man still subject to concupiscence—native attraction to evil, and God-given ontological aspiration after God coexist in the forgiven sinner. The truthful insight expressed in the Protestant view of the justified man, both just and sinner, is actually realized in the dynamic of grace gradually transforming reluctant nature.

God's all and man's nothingness: this may sum up the Protestant view of justification by faith and grace and Christ alone: God doing all and man doing nothing.

This is the expression of a truthful insight: in the realm of grace or of the Christian religion man by himself is unable to do anything: God does everything, so much so that (and here the Catholic insight goes beyond the Protestant expression of God's bounty) He bestows on man, freed from sin, the favor of freely cooperating with grace towards growth in Christ. The two intuitions say, each in its own different manner: a forgiven sinner is called to holiness of life.

**Unity in Diversity.** The unity in faith and Baptism of Protestants and Catholics, who both seek salvation and justification in the same Christ, Redeemer of all mankind, lies hidden in a diversity of theology ever threatening to break that unity. In conclusion one may restate the contrasts between the two theologies.

Protestant theology of justification is based on an experience of saying faith, meaning trustful personal surrender to Christ, the Redeemer from sin; the "empirical nature of the God-encounter" may well be what is most common and characteristic of all Protestant confessions (G. Weigel). Catholic theology of justification is based on faith in the revealed doctrine; the first step to salvation that God's grace enables sinful man to take is his amen to Truth; religious experience may and generally does follow in the wake of this dogmatic assent to Christ, but it is not the first thing or the whole of man's justification. Here lies a typical and far-reaching diversity between the two theologies. The source of this different approach springs from the underlying nominalist and realist theologies, distrust or trust in the human intellect. When reason is unable to reach reality (nominalism), even grace, which does not change nature, cannot enable it to do so; then the only test of the fact of justification, which brings to sinful man Christ's message of forgiveness and salvation, lies in the experience of life. By contrast, if the human intellect is able to grasp being (realism), then the grace of faith can raise man to believe in the truth of the word of God and to assent to what he does not see or feel. He can believe that God in Christ really forgives his sins, admits him into a real fellowship with Him in Christ, enables him to live and act as a child of God and member of Christ, growing in holiness by His unceasing gift of grace unto the full stature of Christ. Catholics believe this on the word of Christ; they do not know it from their personal experience only—this is a complementary test, not the first.

Protestants, on their part, remain hesitant or deny what experience does not manifest. They do not believe in a real (ontological) forgiveness of sin; sinfulness remains after Baptism and all through life, with the dangerous implication of a fatalism skeptical of the possibility of avoiding new sins. Nor do they dare to believe in a real fellowship with God in Christ that goes beyond the experience of trusting faith and surrender; they remain reticent before the mystery of man's ontological transformation in his fellowship with God in Christ. They feel reluctant to say that the root of the new life in Christ that forgiven sinners are enabled to live by grace is an objective transformation of their very being. Despite their agreement to see in good works the needed symptom and fruit of justification, they hesitate to say that the grace of the children of God transforms their good works into deeds meritorious of heaven—merit remaining God's gift to His children. They keep silent

before the hidden mystery of the saints' growth into Christ, a growth that is both ontological and eminently personal.

May one hope that Protestants' hesitation, or agnosticism, before the mystery of being and of transforming grace is only one-sidedness in approach and no denial of what they fail to state? Catholics' apparent overlooking or lessening of the personal and psychological side of the mystery of justification is one-sidedness only. Then, if both agree to remedy their one-sidedness, their precarious unity in diversity may become, under the light of God's grace, a legitimate diversity in unity.

*See also ACTUALISM (IN THEOLOGY); CHURCH, HISTORY OF, III; COLOGNE, SCHOOL OF; CONVERSION TO LIFE OF GRACE; ELEVATION OF MAN; EXTRINSICISM; GRACE AND NATURE; JUSTICE, DOUBLE; NATURAL ORDER; OBEDIENTIAL POTENCY; ORIGINAL JUSTICE; ORIGINAL SIN; PROTESTANTISM; PROTESTANT THEOLOGY, TEMPORARY TRENDS IN; SUPERNATURAL; SUPERNATURAL ORDER; SYNERGISM.*

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[P. DE LETTER]

## JUSTIFICATION, DISPOSITIONS FOR

A \*disposition for \*justification is man's preparedness, his being made ready (with the help of actual \*grace) to receive the gift of sanctifying grace. After describing the nature of a disposition and explaining how such a notion preserves God's supreme freedom and initiative in justifying man, the manner of disposing oneself for justification will be explained.

**Nature.** A disposition in general is a state of being prepared to receive something; it makes the receiver fit to receive, but of itself it does not cause the receiving. To use a simple example: the fact that a container is clean is a disposition one requires if he is to use this container for food, but it is not the cause of his using it for food; his own decision is the cause. So also, man's readiness to be justified is not a cause of justification; it is God who justifies.

**Freedom of God.** This understanding of the term disposition preserves God's supreme freedom and initiative in justifying man. There is no act of mere man that can justify him, because justification is essentially a \*supernatural gift, completely dependent on God's favor (Rom 3:24). After original sin, man's whole salvation depends upon the redemptive grace merited by Christ. The very beginning of justice is due to the prevenient actual grace of God through Jesus Christ (Denz 375, 1525); and without this grace, which both initiates and accompanies the turning toward God, the sinner can do nothing (Denz 1525; ST 1a2ae, 109.6). The special help of God is necessary also for perse-

times deliberately abused as an excuse for licence rather than as a mandate for the liberty of the children of God. His teaching on the \*Parousia (see 2 Pt 3:16), but more to the point his very teaching on justification, seems to have led some to conclude that their post-justification life could be lived in any manner they pleased (1 Cor 6:12 where, "all things are permissible to me," reads like the slogan of such an attitude, taken up by Paul in order to reject it). In Rom 3:8 and 6:1, Paul speaks of those who calumniate his teaching in such a manner. James may well be writing specifically against such people who were using Paul's oral catechesis as an excuse for sin or indifference: freed from the Mosaic Law, justified already by baptismal faith, they no longer recognized any obligations. Paul's teaching had always stressed that the justified man must then live a life consonant with union with the risen Lord.

James, then, is not talking of the "works of the Law," and indeed he never uses this expression. Instead he wishes to insist on the works one must do after one is justified at Baptism—unless that justification is to become a lie. Justification means for James the entire life rather than merely the initial moment when man is given the gift of divine life. He is interested in the works of the justified Christian, for example, charity (Jas 2:14–17), and he makes exactly the same point that is made in 1 Jn 3:16–18, which concludes: "let us not love in word, neither with the tongue, but in deed and truth." This is also, of course, what Paul intended by "faith which works through charity" in Gal 5:6.

There is really no contradiction between Paul and James, and were it not for the fact that they use the same vocabulary in differing senses, the problem might never have arisen. When it is said in Jas 1:18, "Of his own will he has begotten us by the word of truth, that we might be, as it were, the first-fruits of his creatures," it is clear that the teaching of James is the same as that of Paul. When both men are read in conjunction with one another and against the OT background of the term "justification," the complete Biblical doctrine appears in its fullness. No human forensic tribunal can justify man when he is guilty before it, for this would be a perversion of justice; the presumption must always be that it justifies a man falsely accused and thereby vindicates his innocence (OT). But even the OT knows that things are quite different with God, for He can "justify" even the guilty one in so far as His statement forgives him his sins; and such a divine act is an inner change of being for the man concerned or else the Judge of all the world acts unjustly (cf. Is 53:4–12).

In the NT Paul is in a situation of anti-Pharisaic polemic. He argues that the justification whereby God declares a sinner to be now holy before Him can never be effected by man's fidelity to the prescriptions of the Mosaic Law. The sinner is justified only by the gratuitous gift of divine forgiveness. Paul knows full well and stresses quite clearly that thereafter the justified man lives a life of love in the risen Lord. One might say that for Paul justification and salvation (life, holiness) are gratuitous gifts of God, but that while the moment of justification is by faith alone, the life that follows in Christ is by a faith that works through Christ's charity. James, on the other hand, is also in

a polemical situation; most likely, he argues against a false interpretation of Paul's oral teachings. He insists that faith is not a dead act of mere lip service, but must be lived out as Christian love, otherwise faith was not there from the beginning, but merely its outward resemblance.

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[D. M. CROSSAN]

## 2. IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY

Justification, in Catholic doctrine and theology based on Holy Scripture, is the changeover of a man from the state of injustice, or sin, to the state of justice (righteousness), or grace. To see the meaning both of the history of the doctrine and of its metaphysics, one must (1) by way of introduction situate the doctrine in the Christian message, (2) sketch its historical development so as to indicate the main influences that have gone into its making, (3) expound systematically first the revealed doctrine proposed by the Church, then the theological doctrine (mainly according to the mind and principles of the Common Doctor), and (4) indicate some pastoral applications to the understanding of man's situation and contemporary ecumenical trends.

**Setting of the Doctrine in the Christian Message.** The Christian \*kerygma may be summed up in the Good News that all men are saved in Christ. The Word-Incarnate Redeemer, by His Passion, death, and Resurrection, brought to fallen men forgiveness of sins and restored the life of \*grace, which anticipates the glory of Heaven, the completion of man's Redemption. See HEAVEN (THEOLOGY OF). Justification is the application to individual persons of Christ's Redemption. See REDEMPTION (THEOLOGY OF).

Accordingly, the doctrine of justification supposes the revelation of the \*fall of man. All men (Christ and Mary excepted) come into this world, not as just, but as sinners. The universal reign of \*sin, whether original or also personal, involves man's inability to be what he should be, i.e., just, in a twofold aspect. Human sinfulness means forfeiture of the \*supernatural life of grace; it also means congenital debility for doing what is right, or \*concupiscence. No man is just of himself; justification is God's gift to man.

The reparation of the Fall by Christ (see REPARATION, THEOLOGY OF) opens for man the way to justification. By His earthly life, Passion, death, and Resurrection, Christ took away the sins of the world and restored in principle \*original justice lost by the Fall. The objective Redemption has to be applied to particular persons so as to constitute their subjective Redemption, in forgiveness of sin and infusion of grace. Justification is the process that inaugurates this application. It bears a necessary relation to Jesus Christ, Redemption, and grace.

Christ's redemptive mission is continued in and through the Church. It is the continuation of the Word-Incarnate Redeemer, the primary sacrament of Christ (see JESUS CHRIST, THE GREAT SACRAMENT; SACRAMENT OF THE CHURCH). It discharges its mission by dispensing the Sacraments and other means of sanctification. Justification, then, also bears a necessary relation

to the seven Sacraments through which Christ applies to particular persons the fruits of the Redemption (*see SACRAMENTS, THEOLOGY OF*).

This application, however, in morally adult persons requires their free cooperation. Christ does not save men without men. Only infants can be saved, or be given grace and glory, without their personal cooperation, through Baptism. Justification requires from sinful men a true conversion. *See CONVERSION, III (THEOLOGY OF)*. It entails an encounter of the repentant sinner with Christ and God in \*contrition (repentance) or the Sacrament of \*Penance. In justification, God and man, God's grace and man's \*free will, meet.

But the reparation of sinful man in justification is never complete in this life. Not all the gifts of original justice are restored: only those that constitute the life of grace, not those meant to facilitate and to stabilize it, such as the gift of \*integrity. Concupiscence remains in the justified. Only at the consummation of Christ's Redemption in His Second Coming, or \*Parousia, at the end of time will those gifts be restored. Meanwhile, man's justification remains imperfect and in a way precarious. It can be undone by \*mortal sin; and it is always perceptible or capable of growth in grace. Justification, then, on its positive side, as restoration of the life of grace, is only a beginning. Its fulfilment is not for this world but for the next, in glory.

This setting of justification shows the central role it plays in Christian doctrine and life.

**Historical Development.** The term and idea of justification—the sense just explained—originated with St. \*Augustine and is not found as such in Eastern theology. Medieval and subsequent \*scholasticism developed its content speculatively. In face of Protestantism the Council of \*Trent expounded, on the background of scholastic speculation, the meaning of the revealed doctrine it conveys.

**Patristic Theology before St. Augustine.** Justification is found, prior to Augustine, mainly in the doctrine and the liturgy of the Christian initiation, particularly of Baptism, and secondarily in that of penance. Even before the explicit awareness of man's fallen state was expressed in the doctrine of \*original sin at the time of Pelagianism (early 5th century; *see PELAGIUS AND PELAGIANISM*), the instauration of the Christian life through Baptism was commonly proposed under a twofold aspect: forgiveness of sin and participation in the life of Christ. The Greek Fathers emphasized the second aspect with their idea of *houtoiptis* or divinization (*see DIVINE NATURE, PARTAKER OF*), but they were aware that Baptism remits sin. The Latin Fathers, without overlooking the new life in Christ which begins in Baptism [*see REBIRTH (IN THEOLOGY)*], focused their attention more on the forgiveness of sin. While the Greek Fathers spoke of the indwelling Spirit or Word or Trinity as the cause of man's divinization, more than of the created transformation which the indwelling entails (*see INDWELLING, DIVINE*), the Latin Fathers insisted on the change in man rather than on the indwelling. Common to them all at the time, as it also would be with St. Augustine and his followers, was the consideration more of the state following on Baptism and its contrast with man's previous state than of the manner of the changeover from the one to the other.

Thus the Christian condition, as understood by the early Fathers, steers a middle course between the Mani-

chaean concept of man as involving an evil element (what was evil in man, sin, is forgiven), and Stoic pantheism, which sees in man a spark of the divine (man's sharing in the divine nature is a gift of God's grace).

**St. Augustine and Pelagianism.** The occasion for the great Doctor to propose the first formal statement of the doctrine on justification came with Pelagius's denial of man's need of the grace of Christ to be good and do the right thing. Man, in Pelagius's mind, is endowed with free will and so can do good as he wants to. This "asceticism" led him to deny original sin, the basis for this need of Christ's grace and Redemption. The doctrine of original sin, his followers explained, savors of \*Manichaeism. Man, they said, is good and he owes his justice to no one except himself, to the good use he makes of God's gift, that is, his free will.

Against this overt naturalism, the Doctor of Grace rose up to defend man's need of Christ's grace and Redemption. Fallen man, born in sin, cannot be just except through the grace of Christ. The grace of justification is not only remission of sin but also a help to avoid sinning. Justifying grace does not take away all that was entailed in the Fall; concupiscence remains after Baptism, but no longer as a \*guilt, only as a fact—*transit actu, remanet actu*. Justification supposes man's cooperation, but it is God's grace that enables him to lend his cooperation; of himself he cannot do anything as he should, because concupiscence or inordinate self-love inevitably vitiates his actions, even such as seem to be virtuous, unless healing grace purifies them. This cooperation of man with God may be summed up in living \*faith, or faith, \*hope, and \*charity, all of this being God's gift to man, faith not excluded.

This Augustinian concept of justification was to have a far-reaching influence on subsequent Latin theology. One should note here that, in Augustine's mind, as in that of his contemporaries, justifying grace is grace taken as a whole without any distinction between actual and habitual grace. The reason for its necessity he derived primarily from man's fallen state, i.e., from the healing function of grace; its elevating function is not excluded (St. Augustine also spoke of man's divinization by grace), but it was hardly considered in his anti-Pelagian teaching on justification. At the time, the distinction between nature and supernature had not yet been made explicit, so Augustine too considered the human condition as it is, existentially. He further affirmed man's free cooperation with grace, but made no attempt at "reconciling" grace and free will; rather, in his mind, grace restores free will to its native perfection. Lastly, keeping the grain of truth contained in Manichaeism, Augustine was not blind to the disorder of concupiscence, which remains after Baptism. This Augustinian teaching on justification—in *facto esse* rather than in fieri—is the first systematized statement of the Christian condition after Baptism.

The most important element in the doctrine, decisive for all further development, is that the \*justice of men is God's gift to men, a sharing in the \*justice of God, which blends with mercy when He saves those who would "justly" be condemned. For Augustine this gravity is the most sensitive point: all initiative in the process of justification must be said to come from God and not from man. When some "remainders of the Pelagian heresy," later to be known as \*Semi-Pelagianism, suggested that at times God's grace awaits man's

good move toward justification (John \*Cassian), Augustine retorted that the beginning of faith, including the very assent of the mind to the message of "salvation, no less than any subsequent growth and maintenance or \*perseverance of justification, is God's gift and grace.

Augustine's influence in the West was decisive in shaping its doctrine on justification, with its stress on the remission of sin (its negative side), on its total gratuity, and on its relative imperfection—all this being an echo of his doctrine on the Fall and its consequences. In the East, that influence was considerably less. The Greek Fathers remained reluctant to call sin what is in man independently of his personal free will, and continued to stress rather their doctrine of divinization, *θεοποίησις*.

*Medieval Scholasticism.* When passing over from the patristic to the scholastic theology of justification (the historical transition took several centuries, from the 8th to the 12th), one enters upon a very different mentality. The pastoral and practical approach of the Fathers made way for a speculative and scholastic, not to say academic, one. The main problem before the school was that of the connection between the negative and positive sides of justification, i.e., between remission of sin and infusion of grace. Is this connection, they asked, merely factual, known from revealed and traditional doctrine, or is it necessary? The investigation of this problem led scholastic theologians to study not merely the state of justification as contrasted with the state of sin, but the very process of the changeover from the one to the other. The study of the problem was prepared for by the adoption into scholastic theology of Aristotelian philosophy and the gradual elaboration of some concepts regarding sin and grace, such as act and habit, change or mutation in the light of formal and material \*causality (see THEOLOGY, INFLUENCE OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY ON). The question then was this: How and why does the habitual state of sin make room for the state of grace or the habit of grace?

The various schools that took up the problem may be grouped as marked either by \*intellectualism or \*voluntarism. The first is characteristic of St. Thomas Aquinas. In the realism of his theory of intellectual knowledge (see KNOWLEDGE, THEORIES OF), valid even when bearing on supernatural realities, he applied to the changeover from the state of sin to the state of grace the general metaphysics of mutation: the expelling of one \*form by the infusion of a new one. He thus showed the organic and necessary connection between remission of sin and infusion of grace, and, in another aspect, between God's action and man's free cooperation. To his mind, justification involves, by the nature of things, both the negative and the positive aspects, and both the divine and the human actions. Grace and sin being what they are, justification cannot but be the complex happening, worked by God and seconded by man, in which habitual sin is expelled from the soul by the new form that is grace. The two are inseparable. Other questions, e.g., regarding the degree of grace infused or the persistence of concupiscence, he explained in a similar way, not merely from God's disposition (this disposition, in St. Thomas's mind, is expressed in the very nature of things: *scientia Dei causat rerum*). The whole of this theology of justification thus moves on the objective or ontological level. This trust in the realism of man's intellectual knowledge of the supernatural realities sets

theology a thrilling task: *fides quaerens intellectum* in the light of the synthesis of Augustinianism and Aristotelian metaphysics which is St. Thomas's achievement.

The other trend, voluntarism, is proper to the Franciscan School. It started with St. \*Bonaventure and through \*Duns Scotus led to the \*nominalism of Ockham (see OCKHAMISM). St. Bonaventure prepared the way: he occasionally stated that remission of sin and infusion of grace are connected in fact but not in principle. Scotus further developed this view, saying that the two are connected only by God's decree, not of their nature. While identifying grace and charity, and seeing in habitual sin nothing more than *ordinatio ad poenam*, and in grace a sanctifying power by virtue only of an *acceptatio Dei* (not of its nature), he ruined the organic structure of justification. God's will, he said, is the sole reason for the actual connection between remission of sin and infusion of grace. *Voluntas Dei causa rerum*. Ockham went one step further. He not only saw in God's decree the sole reason for the connection between the two aspects of justification, but by denying the realism of man's intellect and attributing to man's concepts a merely nominalist value, he concluded that God could decree otherwise; that is, He could infuse grace without forgiving sin.

This voluntarism disrupts the organic concept of justification elaborated by St. Thomas. Its nominalism rejects his realism; man's concepts cannot be relied upon to express supernatural reality, revelation alone can manifest God's disposition, which is the reason why things are what they are. It could be otherwise: grace could be infused and sin still remain. On this distrust of the intellect followed a gradual shift from the ontological to the psychological level: experience must check the data of revelation. Voluntarism, nominalism, and \*psychologism naturally go together. As commonly agreed, this nominalist theology opened the way for Luther's idea of forensic justification: God not only could, He does justify without forgiving sin (as Luther's experience seemed to confirm). This very deviation of the nominalist view of justification is a pointer to its weakness. No wonder common scholastic doctrine would rally around the organic conception of Thomistic realism.

*Trent and Post-Tridentine Scholasticism.* The Council of Trent in face of Protestant theology (see JUSTIFICATION, 3) restated and defined the Catholic doctrine. Its decree on justification was decisive for the subsequent development of scholastic theology. Three main points must be noted: justification implies the real remission of sins (Denz 1528) and not merely their nonimputation for punishment (cf. Denz 1561), despite the persistence after Baptism of concupiscence (cf. Denz 1515); it entails an interior renewal by the infusion of grace and gifts (Denz 1528), i.e., a new objective reality, whatever may appear or not appear on the psychological level (cf. Denz 1533, 1562–65); it supposes man's voluntary acceptance of grace and gifts (Denz 1528), a free cooperation that sums up faith, hope, repentance, and love that prepared justification (cf. Denz 1526).

The influence of this doctrine on scholastic theology consisted, first of all, in a rehabilitation of the realist trend, of the organic concept of justification of the Thomist school, although not altogether uninfluenced by the Scotist ideas. A typical example in this regard is

\*Suárez's idea of the physical (not metaphysical) incompatibility of the state of sin and the state of grace; this idea toned down Thomistic realism without disregarding it altogether. The Tridentine teaching further determined two emphases in the subsequent theology of justification. Its doctrine on the interior renewal of the soul invited insistence on grace as a form inherent in the soul; and its doctrine of the voluntary acceptance of grace led to an emphasis of man's free cooperation with grace, shifting, however, the point of debate from habitual to actual grace, as appears from the subsequent "systems" of grace that were proposed to explain the co-existence of \*free will and grace. As often happens, the reaction to the Reform led to an overstressing. The stress on grace as a real form in the soul led some to overlook its essentially relative character as a link with Uncreated Grace (see GRACE, UNCREATED). And the emphasis on man's free cooperation with grace for justification focused attention unduly on actual rather than on habitual grace and led to a disproportionate importance being given to the latter. Contemporary theology of justification mainly follows the classic theology of St. Thomas and reacts against the two mentioned excesses: it seeks to restore Uncreated Grace in the process and state of justification, and to give importance to the renewal brought with habitual grace, rather than to the problem of grace and free will. It also endeavors to integrate the results of modern psychology and to synthesize the ontological and psychological approaches.

**Church's Teaching.** The definitive teaching of the Church on justification is found in the Tridentine decree *de Iustificatione* (Denz 1520-83); this decree sums up and synthesizes the doctrine of preceding centuries, particularly the teachings of the Councils of \*Carthage and \*Orange convened against Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism; nothing substantial has been added since. Trent's anti-Protestant bias, however, entailed one-sidedness in some respects.

The decree first outlines the context of man's justification, viz., the universal Redemption of Christ, who came to repair fallen men and whose grace is to be applied to individual persons in justification (Denz 1521-23). A first point of doctrine on justification itself is that the initiative comes from God's grace and not from man's free will, yet it requires man's free cooperation (Denz 1524-27). See JUSTIFICATION, DISPOSITIONS FOR. This rules out the error of Semi-Pelagianism, formerly set aside by the second Council of Orange (Denz 373-378) and recondemned by Trent (Denz 1525), and the Protestant view excluding man's free cooperation with grace (Denz 1554).

Justification itself "is not only remission of sins but also sanctification and renovation of the interior man by the voluntary reception of grace and gifts" (Denz 1528). This description includes three dogmatic statements which are the hinges of the Catholic doctrine on justification.

**Remission of Sins.** In the mind of Trent, whatever is truly and properly sin is taken away and is not merely brushed over or not imputed (Denz 1515). It cannot be otherwise if man's objective Redemption in Christ means liberation from sin (Denz 1522) and is applied to man in justification (Denz 1523). It does not mean, however, that concupiscence does not remain: this is "left to provide trial but has no power to harm those who

do not consent and who, by the grace of Jesus Christ, manfully resist" (Denz 1515); it is no longer sin but called so in an improper sense "because it is from sin and inclines to sin" (*Ibid.*). Hence Trent taught both the reality of the remission of sin and its imperfection because of remaining concupiscence.

**Sanctification and Renovation.** The interior man is made holy and is renewed through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts (Denz 1528): it is a new consecration to God and entails a new reality in man by the infusion of grace and gifts. In justification men are reborn and are given justifying grace (Denz 1523): grace and charity infused in the souls and inhering in them (Denz 1561). The formal constituent of this new reality was stated with insistence: "the only formal cause [of justification] is the 'justice of God, not that justice by which He is Himself just, but the justice by which He makes us just' and gifted with which by Him we are renewed in the spirit of our mind" (Denz 1529). This insistence aimed at excluding the Protestant view of a forensic justification without objective change in man: "not only are we considered as just, but we are truly said to be just and are just." Thus what is now called sanctifying grace, i.e., the grace one receives in justification as a permanent gift of God, constitutes man in the state of grace and justice. The Council spoke of the only formal cause of justification to exclude G. Seripando's view about a twofold justice or double formal cause: one inherent, man's own justice always imperfect; and one imputed, God's justice. This attempt at meeting the Protestants half way was not accepted by the Council (see JUSTICE, DOUBLE). Instead, it explained that what they called imputation of God's justice or application of the merits of Christ in fact takes place in the infusion of charity through the merits of Christ's Passion, by which the just are united to Jesus Christ and receive through Him the infused gifts of faith, hope, and charity (Denz 1530; see IMPUTATION OF JUSTICE AND MERIT). The Council spoke indifferently of grace or/and charity (see Denz 1561, after 1530); on set purpose it abstained from deciding whether they are distinct or not, so as not to favor either of the two opinions held by Catholics. Accordingly, the renovation of the interior man, "wherby a man becomes just instead of unjust, and friend instead of enemy" (Denz 1528; see FRIENDSHIP WITH GOD) means the reception of grace together with faith, hope, and charity as permanent gifts from God through the merits of Christ.

**Free Acceptance.** The reception of grace and gifts is voluntary (Denz 1528). It includes a free movement on man's part, a free movement toward God in faith, hope, and charity (Denz 1530) or in living faith (Denz 1531). Does it include repentance? This is not mentioned here explicitly, but it is among the preparatory acts (Denz 1526) and this disposition remains in the process and at the moment of justification (cf. Denz 1559). Repentance is not mentioned in the decree on original sin, which speaks only of the remission of original sin (cf. Denz 1515); but it is found in the chapter on the restoration of grace to those who sin after justification (Denz 1542); there is no remission of personal sins after Baptism (or "third justification") without Penance and contrition. A *pari* one must say that, in the teaching of Trent, also in the first justification, when it regards not

only original sin but also personal sins (as is supposed in Denz 1526, 1528), repentance is supposed as one element of a sinner's voluntary acceptance of grace and gifts.

*Other Conciliar Teaching.* These three doctrinal statements of Trent are the main dogmatic basis for the theology of justification. The Council also enumerated the other causes of justification, besides the formal cause (Denz 1529): its final cause is the glory of God and Christ, and life eternal; the efficient cause is God Himself in His gratuitous mercy; the meritorious cause is Our Lord Jesus Christ, who redeemed man by His Passion on the cross; the instrumental cause is Baptism, the Sacrament of faith, for the first justification, received either in fact or only in desire (cf. Denz 1524); or, for the recovery of grace lost by personal sin after Baptism, the Sacrament of Penance received in fact or at least in desire (cf. Denz 1542, 1677). In this teaching of the Council one must note the Trinitarian aspect of justification: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are mentioned as having a role in man's justification (Denz 1528-30); but this role and the just's relationships to the Persons are not stressed: the stress is on created grace. Yet, in the teaching of the Council, the grace of justification entails a new relation or union with God, with the \*Holy Spirit, and with Christ.

On the gift of justice, or grace given in justification, the Council decree proposes several points of doctrine. First, grace is given in varying degrees to various persons, depending on the good pleasure of the Holy Spirit and on each person's dispositions (Denz 1529). This teaching on the inequality of grace sets aside the error of Pelagianism and Protestantism claiming equal justice for all. Second, justice or grace is capable of increasing and is meant to increase. It actually grows by good and meritorious works which the just do in keeping the commandments (Denz 1535, cf. 1574, 1582). By its doctrine on \*merit, the Council repudiated the Protestant view of justification by faith alone. Finally, in face again of the Reformers' teaching on the inadmissibility of justice, the decree taught that grace can be lost, and is actually lost, by every mortal sin, not only by a sin of infidelity (Denz 1544, 1572).

Two more points of doctrine have an import for the psychology of justification. First, the relative uncertainty of the fact of man's justification: "no one can know with the certainty of faith, which cannot admit of error, that he has obtained God's grace" (Denz 1534; see CERTITUDE OF FAITH); this, however, does not exclude a possible moral certitude. Second, there is uncertainty about the gift of final perseverance (Denz 1541; see PERSEVERANCE, FINAL). In their historical setting, these doctrinal statements were meant to set aside what was overstatement in the Protestant views on the certitude of justifying faith or trust (Denz 1562) or of predestination [Denz 1540, 1565-67; see PREDESTINATION (IN NON-CATHOLIC THEOLOGY)], but they keep a normative value today with regard to the psychology of justification.

**Systematic Exposition.** The order of treatment is: the theology of the three Tridentine statements, description of the changeover from sin to grace (St. Thomas, ST 1a2ae, 113), and a discussion of other theological questions.

**Theology of the Tridentine Statements.** Justification,

according to the first statement of Trent, implies true remission of sins or removal of the state of sin, i.e., of habitual sin that follows on the sinful acts. God cannot consider one as just or nonsinner without making him just: His knowledge causes things to be. Habitual sin is a permanent and guilty turning away from God as supernatural goal. For its removal it requires a reorientation of man to God. It is a voluntary deprivation or permanent rejection of what gives reality to man's striving for God, viz, grace and the accompanying gifts. Hence its cessation or real removal implies, for the sinner's reconversion to God, the restoration of grace and gifts. As God alone gives grace, so God alone forgives sin.

*Infusion of grace and gifts*, according to Trent, means, therefore, the restoration of a sinner in habitual orientation to God as supernatural end. Through grace with faith, hope, and charity man is effectively looking up to God for his salvation. As man strives for his goal by his activity, what gives him the capacity of striving for his supernatural end is a dynamic principle superadded to his natural powers and raising them onto a level with the supernatural end. Grace and gifts bestowed in justification are thus perfections that actuate the soul and its faculties in their aspect of \*obediential potency for supernatural and theological activity, i.e., for striving for God as final goal. When endowed with this elevating and "divinizing" dynamism in his being and active powers, man is just: he is what he should be, after God's salvific will.

Scholastic theology speaks of infusion of habits, whether remotely operative (entitative habits) or proximately so. See HABIT (IN THEOLOGY). They are divinely given perfections in the substance of the soul (grace) or in the faculties (virtues) enabling a just man effectively to strive for the completion of the union with God in glory of which they are a beginning.

Both remission of sins and infusion of grace, being the negative and positive sides of one changeover, suppose, according to Trent, man's free cooperation. The basic reason for this is that both the state of sin and the state of grace are personal relationships with God—either voluntary separation from Him or voluntary union with Him. In a person capable of free acts, they can neither originate nor be undone without his personal or free act. The removal of sin and reception of grace therefore suppose a free turning away from sin called repentance and, when complete and effective, contrition (as opposed to attrition, or incomplete repentance; see ATTRITION AND ATTRITIONISM), and a free turning to God in living faith, or faith with hope and charity.

This voluntary cooperation in his justification entails on man's part awareness of his movement against sin and movement toward God. This raises the question of the psychology of justification: To what extent can a repentant sinner be aware of having his sins forgiven and of being restored to grace? (See Awareness of Man's Justification in this article.)

*Changeover from Sin to Grace.* Justification is the instantaneous changeover in a repentant sinner in which God moves him from a state of sin to the state of grace. God's action consists in forgiving sin and infusing grace; man's cooperation entails recession from sin through contrition and accession to grace and God

through living faith, or faith, hope, and charity (ST 1a2ae, 113.1; 113.7-8).

A threefold problem arises here, that of the relation (1) between God's action and man's cooperation; (2) between the two aspects of God's justifying action: remission of sin and infusion of grace; (3) between the two components of man's cooperation: contrition and faith-hope-charity. First, however, one must consider the change itself.

The change in justification, as every metaphysical or objective change, i.e., loss of a perfection or form and gain of a new form, happens in an instant, however gradual and slow may be the preparation for the change. The loss of one form is the gain of another; *corruptio unius est generatio alterius*. The very cessation of the state of sin is the inception of the state of grace, and vice versa. Justification, for all its being a supernatural event, is no exception to the rule (ST 1a2ae, 113.7).

This being so, the key to the solution of the above-mentioned threefold problem lies in the principle of mutual priority and causality which, in St. Thomas's mind, is the law of every objective change or mutation. One may enunciate the principle as follows: In the changeover from one state of perfection to another, the introducing of the new form determines or causes or is prior to the expelling or cessation of the previous form in the line of formal causality; while in the line of dispositive or material causality the cessation of the previous form causes or is prior to the introducing of the new form. The principle applies to what is form and matter (or \*disposition) not only in the proper sense of the terms, but also in an analogical sense, i.e., of determining and determined principle. A new form is gained because a previous one is lost, and a previous form is lost because a new form is gained. In the case of justification, sin is remitted because grace is infused, and grace is infused because sin is remitted. "Because" here expresses formal and dispositive (or material) causality, not efficient causality. One must now apply this principle to the threefold problem.

(1) God's Action and Man's Cooperation: God is the mover and man is being moved, but, being free, man is moved as a free being that moves itself, i.e., not without his free cooperation. The intercausality plays between God forgiving sin and infusing grace or, to be brief, the infusion of grace, and man's voluntary reception of grace. Infusion of grace is prior to man's cooperation; it causes his free reception of grace not by way of efficient but of formal causality. Inversely, man's free cooperation or voluntary reception is prior to the infusion of grace by God in the line of dispositive or material causality; man's acceptance, as the last disposition for grace, causes dispository the infusion of grace. The two, therefore, God's action and man's cooperation, condition one another, in different ways; they do not and cannot hinder or oppose one another.

It may seem strange that man's free acceptance, as last disposition for the infusion of grace, should be caused by that very infusion; that would be impossible if it were caused by way of efficient causality, and not, as is the case, by way of formal causality. Nor is there anything against saying that God's infusion of grace "depends" on man's free cooperation by way of dispositive causality. God cannot infuse grace except into a receptive soul, one disposed for grace, the disposition being also caused in another aspect by grace itself. In

every change the last disposition for a new form is caused by and in turn determines the introduction of the new form (of course, in different aspects); in this case, man's voluntary acceptance of grace is caused by and in turn determines the infusion of grace.

(2) Remission of Sin and Infusion of Grace: Sin is forgiven because grace is infused, and grace is infused because sin is forgiven. In the aspect of dispositive causality, the cessation of the state of sin determines, as last disposition, the infusion of grace. In turn, in the aspect of formal causality, the infusion of grace causes or determines the cessation of the state of sin as last disposition of the subject for the new form that is grace. God thus remits sin by infusing grace. Grace expels sin.

This concept shows the metaphysical impossibility of separating the two: forgiveness of sin and infusion of grace. It is inconceivable and would imply a contradiction, that God should infuse grace without forgiving sin, or forgive sin without infusing grace. This realistic concept of justification precludes any sort of imputative or forensic justification. It also excludes an attenuated incompossibility of sin and grace, as if God could *de potentia absoluta* (but not *de potentia ordinata*) infuse grace while sin remains, or remit sin without infusing grace.

(3) Contrition and Faith-with-Charity: Man's move against sin is (perfect) contrition when and because he moves toward God in faith enlivened by charity. Contrition is the last disposition of a repentant sinner for the infusion of grace and charity. It is charity in turn that causes repentance to be contrition. Contrition is perfect because of charity, and as ultimate disposition it causes charity to be infused. Contrition and charity condition one another; they coexist only at the instant of justification, not before. Contrition is not there until charity is, and vice versa, by virtue of formal and material intercausality between them.

The chief implication of this concept of contrition perfected by charity as constituting man's cooperation with God in justification is that there is only one way for man to be ultimately disposed for the infusion of grace, whether in or outside the Sacraments, viz, perfect contrition. There can be only one ultimate disposition for one form; only contrition is a sinner's last disposition for grace. The difference between sacramental and extrasacramental justification is accidental; it regards not the ultimate disposition for grace but the manner in which this ultimate disposition comes about. Charity, determining contrition as last disposition for grace, can be infused by God either through or without a Sacrament (though not without the *votum* of the Sacrament). This shows the foundation of the contemporary trend in sacramental theology that insists on the dispositions of the recipient and no longer holds what until recently was the more common opinion, that the Sacrament makes up for man's imperfect dispositions (*see CONTRITION*).

*Other Theological Questions.* There are four additional theological questions that merit consideration.

(1) Relative Imperfection of Justification. Why is it that grace can be and is infused while concupiscence remains and causes the state of grace to be always more or less precarious? St. Thomas's theology of original justice answers: because in the justification of a sinner sanctifying grace is given, not by virtue of a disposition of his nature but because of a personal disposition. Grace, a

gift to the person, is restored without the gift to nature (integrity or immunity from concupiscence) being restored. Were grace given because of a disposition of nature without any personal cooperation or voluntary acceptance (as would have been the case if original justice had been transmitted), then it would entail or suppose the restoration of integrity.

As a result of this imperfection of man's justification it is possible to lose grace; it is even morally impossible for the just to keep in grace and avoid all grave sin without the help of grace (which, it must be noted, is not withheld from them).

(2) Awareness of Man's Justification. Since man's voluntary reception of grace and gifts is his indispensable cooperation in justification, a justified sinner, it would seem, must be aware of the grace he receives. This conclusion, however, is only partly true. A justified sinner is aware of his repentance, with faith, hope, and charity. But he is not directly aware of the supernaturalness of these dispositions and of the infusion of grace; he has only an implicit or "lived" sense of what by faith he knows to happen in justification. The result is that, when analyzing his psychological dispositions, he cannot perceive anything more than signs of his changeover from sin to grace, such as his effective resolution to abstain from sin. On the basis of these, and of his knowledge of having done what is needed to obtain forgiveness of sin, he can come to a moral certitude of his state of grace (see GRACE, CONSCIOUSNESS OF).

(3) Justification and Uncreated Grace. Trent, it was pointed out above, mentions, without insistence on them, the relationships with God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit that originate in justification. Theology today stresses the doctrine of the indwelling in a definitely Trinitarian perspective. Because the created gifts of grace are of their nature links with Uncreated Grace, justification of necessity entails a role of the indwelling Three Persons. Grace and divine indwelling are correlative concepts. This means that, while created grace is the only formal cause of justification, or the only inherent form, Uncreated Grace is the "quasi-form" of man's justification, i.e., not as inhering form but as indwelling Guest. Justification of necessity originates personal relationships to the indwelling Trinity. In a very different perspective this aspect of justification expresses what is emphasized in the Protestant view of justification: that men are just by the justice of God (see MEDIATION, DIVINE; INDWELLING, DIVINE).

(4) Increase of Justice and Restoration of Lost Grace. For what at the time of Trent was called second and third justification, namely, the growth in grace by meritorious works and the regaining of sanctifying grace which was lost by mortal sin, see CONTRITION; GRACE; MERIT; PENANCE, SACRAMENT OF; SACRAMENTS.

**Pastoral Conclusions.** The Catholic doctrine on justification and its Thomistic understanding entail pastoral consequences, some of which may be stated in conclusion.

**Man's Existential Situation.** For the correct understanding of man's present situation, one may note three points flowing from the doctrine of justification.

First, since man's cooperation in his justification is essential and irreplaceable, the need for sincerity and genuineness in religious practice is imperative. Without repentance perfected by charity (which includes faith and hope), no justification and hence no genuine reli-

gious life is possible. It makes no difference whether justification takes place in or outside the reception of a Sacrament. There is no substitute for man's cooperation. In Thomistic theology, this cooperation is the same in all cases, viz., contrition perfected by charity. In sacramental justification the Sacrament may help to bring it about. From this follows the need for insisting, as is done in contemporary theology and pastoral doctrine of the Sacraments, on the *opus operantis* (see EX OPERE OPERANTIS).

Second, the presence of concupiscence even in the justified entails that it is not possible to live in grace without struggle and watchfulness (see JUSTICE OF MBN). So much is this the case that, unless they be helped by healing grace, the justified are unable to preserve for long the state of grace. Yet, because this help is offered them at all times, they always can, if they wish, persevere in sanctifying grace. There is, evidently, a need of uniting distrust of self and trust in God's never-failing grace, a psychological equilibrium which it is not easy to achieve and to maintain.

Third, the supernatural event of justification is of its nature an ontological change, whose psychological repercussions may and do betray its reality in some signs. But remission of sin and infusion of grace in no way coincide with the resolving of a guilt complex and its attending peace of soul as sought for by \*psychoanalysis. The latter is a therapeutic method or device, helpful and effective in its own line, but foreign to the religious and metaphysical remission of sin by infusion of grace, which is a supernatural reality. Psychoanalysis may eventually, in cases of morbid guilt complex, free the way for the voluntary cooperation of man with grace, but it is neither a substitute for nor, in normal cases, a help for the theological return to God's grace that is justification.

**Ecumenical Presentation of Trent's Doctrine.** Despite the Council of Trent's overtly anti-Protestant bias, which stiffened the oppositions and blurred or left unmentioned the points of contact between the Catholic and the Protestant doctrines, one may single out one or other point of doctrine which indicates areas of agreement.

First, the Lutheran concept of forensic justification, based on the identification of concupiscence and sin, logically concludes to a mere nonimputation, not a real remission, of sin; this concept entails that a justified man is both just and sinner (*simul iustus et peccator*). The Catholic doctrine, too, holds that concupiscence remains in the justified; but it is reluctant to call it sin except in an improper sense, i.e., insofar as it comes from sin and inclines to sin. The two positions are more apparently than really opposed. What the Protestant view calls sinfulness in the justified may well be nothing more than the inclination to evil which the Catholic concept sees in concupiscence. Perhaps a more basic difference may be found in the idea of freedom required, in the Catholic view, for both sin and merit, but excluded, it seems, in the Lutheran position, perhaps even here more apparently than really.

Second, the Protestant idea of the relationship of the justified with Christ and God in trustful faith, which in justification initiates a new religious attitude of life despite the mentioned persistence of sin, may well imply some newness in man that is not so distant from created grace. Actually, the Catholic doctrine also sees in the